Background: May 9 Protests and Violence

On May 9, 2023, Pakistan was rocked by violent unrest after former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest in a graft case. Supporters of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) took to the streets in several cities, attacking or vandalising multiple public and military installations. Notably, protesters stormed the Corps Commander’s House in Lahore (Jinnah House) and even targeted the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. The military’s media wing denounced the events as a “Black Day” and announced that rioters who attacked military sites would be tried under the Army Act. In the immediate aftermath, authorities launched a widespread crackdown: thousands of PTI workers and leaders were arrested nationwide. Imran Khan was released shortly after the initial arrest due to court intervention, but the chaos of May 9 set the stage for a broader campaign against PTI. (Khan himself would later be rearrested on other charges and has remained behind bars since August 2023.) The May 9 incidents marked an unprecedented breach of Pakistan’s sensitive military installations and triggered a firm response from the government and military establishment.

Legal Context and Charges Against Yasmin Rashid

Dr. Yasmin Rashid – a senior PTI leader and former Punjab health minister – was among those implicated in the May 9 disturbances. Prosecutors accused her of involvement in what came to be known as the “Sherpao Bridge case” in Lahore. According to the First Information Report (FIR) lodged at the Sarwar Road Police Station, Dr. Rashid and other party leaders allegedly delivered provocative speeches and incited PTI supporters to violence at Lahore’s Sherpao Bridge during the protests. The charges against her included inciting rioting, arson, and damage to public property, all framed as terrorism-related offenses under Pakistan’s anti-terrorism laws.

Investigators contended that the violent acts on May 9 were not spontaneous but pre-planned. In court, the Deputy Prosecutor General argued that a “May 9 conspiracy” was hatched on May 7 at PTI Chairman Imran Khan’s Lahore residence (Zaman Park) – implying that party leaders, including Yasmin Rashid, had coordinated their response in advance. Witnesses testified that they were present at this alleged May 7 meeting where strategies were discussed in case Khan was detained. As per the prosecution, when Imran Khan was indeed arrested on May 9, Dr. Rashid and others acted “according to the plan” by exhorting crowds and leading them towards violent agitation. These claims were vigorously denied by the defence. Yasmin Rashid’s counsel pointed out that the original FIR named some 400 suspects, yet only 14 were actually put on trial, arguing that authorities had “cherry-picked” the accused without solid evidence. The defence further noted that the FIR initially made no mention of any conspiracy or incitement by Dr. Rashid, and that these allegations were developed later during the investigation. They also highlighted the lack of documented injuries on May 9 and even accused authorities of damaging police vehicles themselves to fabricate charges. Despite these arguments, the allegations positioned Dr. Yasmin Rashid as one of the key instigators of the May 9 mayhem in Lahore.

Court Proceedings and Verdict

Given the security concerns, the trial of Yasmin Rashid and her co-accused was held inside Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat Jail, which is where they were detained. An Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) judge, Arshad Javed, presided over the case in a jail courtroom. Fourteen individuals, including Dr. Rashid, were indicted in the Sherpao Bridge case and faced trial on charges stemming from the May 9 riots. The prosecution presented evidence in the form of documents and testimony from 61 witnesses, aiming to prove that the accused had orchestrated and participated in the violent acts. After several months of proceedings – and reportedly following daily hearings as courts rushed to conclude May 9 cases within a four-month deadline set by the Supreme Court – the ATC reached a decision in late July 2025.

On July 22, 2025, Dr. Yasmin Rashid was found guilty in the Sherpao Bridge case and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The same sentence was handed down to several other senior PTI figures tried alongside her, including former provincial minister Mian Mehmood Dur Rasheed, ex-Punjab Governor Omar Sarfraz Cheema, and PTI Senator Ejaz Chaudhry. In total, the court convicted eight PTI leaders (and a few party activists) in this case, each receiving a decade-long prison term. “Rigorous imprisonment” in this context means the jail term may involve hard labor. All the convicted individuals were present in the courtroom when Judge Javed announced the verdict at around 9:30 pm inside Kot Lakhpat Jail, amid tight security.

Not everyone on trial was convicted: the ATC acquitted six accused due to insufficient evidence. Notably, PTI Vice Chairman and former Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was acquitted – his lawyers had successfully argued that he was in Karachi on May 9 and nowhere near the Lahore protests. Several other co-accused were also exonerated after the judge found the prosecution’s proof against them inadequate. But for Yasmin Rashid and the others convicted, the court determined that the prosecution had established their role in the violence that unfolded after Imran Khan’s arrest. The convicts were held responsible for inciting a mob, engaging in “anarchy”, vandalism, and arson at the Sherpao Bridge locale and its vicinity. Along with the prison sentences, these convictions carry significant political consequences: under Article 63(1)(g) of Pakistan’s Constitution, anyone found guilty of charges involving moral turpitude or anti-state activities is disqualified from holding public office. This means Dr. Yasmin Rashid and her co-accused, many of whom are prominent political figures, stand to be barred from elections or legislative posts as a result of the verdict.

Government and Official Statements on the Verdict

The reaction from government officials was one of approval and resolve. The federal government welcomed the ATC’s decision as a step toward accountability for the May 9 chaos. Barrister Aqeel Malik, the Minister of State for Law and Justice, lauded the verdict, stating in a press conference that “justice has been upheld” by the Sargodha and Lahore ATCs. He emphasized that due process was followed and that the convictions were “in accordance with the law and the Constitution,” dismissing PTI’s complaints to the contrary. Malik stressed that “when you take the law into your own hands, whether you’re an MNA or MPA or opposition leader, …the law is equal for everyone”, underscoring that high office affords no immunity from prosecution. The state minister expressed hope that all remaining May 9-related cases would be decided soon, indicating the government’s commitment to wrapping up the accountability process for the riots.

Law enforcement and military officials have portrayed the May 9 crackdown as necessary for restoring order. According to Minister Malik, the May 9 riots were “carefully curated” via planning to precisely attack over 200 specific locations – suggesting a wide-ranging conspiracy behind the unrest. This aligns with earlier claims by the Army and government that the vandalism was orchestrated rather than a spontaneous outpouring of anger. The military, having branded May 9 as a “Black Day”, insisted on stringent measures, including trying some rioters under military laws. Indeed, Pakistan’s Army Chief at the time vowed to bring all perpetrators to justice, and the Army’s public relations wing (ISPR) defended the subsequent trials (even in military courts) as lawful. The government also points out that courts themselves – not the executive – conducted the trials and delivered these sentences. In the eyes of officials, the conviction of Yasmin Rashid and others validates the state’s stance that attacks on public and defense installations will not be tolerated, and serves as a deterrent against any such political violence in the future.

PTI’s Response and Plan to Appeal

PTI has fiercely rejected the court’s verdict, calling it politically motivated and unjust. In a late-night press conference following the sentences, PTI leaders condemned the judgments as an “assault on the judicial system” and evidence that courts were now acting as “instruments of the establishment”. Salman Akram Raja, a senior PTI leader and lawyer, lamented that the justice system had been “completely demolished” by such decisions. “Today’s verdict is not a punishment for our leaders, it’s a punishment for democracy,” he asserted, framing Dr. Rashid’s 10-year sentence as part of a broader crackdown on the party’s right to dissent.

PTI’s legal team also decried the trial as unfair. Barrister Gohar Ali Khan, who chairs PTI’s legal committee, said the judiciary had “failed” by handing down harsh sentences without, in his view, fulfilling the requirements of justice. He and others noted that the same two prosecution witnesses seemed to be appearing in multiple May 9 cases across different cities, suggesting a formulaic or flimsy basis for the convictions. Another PTI lawyer, former minister Babar Awan, accused the authorities of misusing anti-terror laws, saying the Anti-Terrorism Act was being wielded as a weapon to “demolish the rule of law in Pakistan” and suppress political opposition. Awan even warned that branding political leaders as terrorists and jailing them for a decade could imperil Pakistan’s international standing – citing concerns about the country’s GSP+ trade status and compliance with global norms (an allusion to human rights obligations).

From the party’s perspective, Dr. Yasmin Rashid’s conviction is part of a systematic attempt to “crush a democratically elected political party”. A PTI spokesperson denounced the verdict as a “blatant and grave violation of principles of justice” and vowed that the party “will challenge these verdicts in the superior courts”. In fact, PTI has already announced plans to appeal Dr. Rashid’s conviction. Several of the convicted leaders, including Punjab Assembly opposition leader Malik Ahmad Khan Bhachar (who was sentenced in a parallel May 9 case in Sargodha), have stated their intent to file appeals in the Lahore High Court. They argue that the trial court’s judgment deviated from constitutional principles and lacked credible evidence, and they hope a higher court might overturn the convictions. PTI’s top brass is simultaneously rallying public support; the party recently launched a new protest campaign – scheduled to culminate on August 5 – in what appears to be a direct response to the legal setbacks. In short, PTI is treating Yasmin Rashid’s sentencing not as the end of the fight, but as a rallying point to press its narrative of victimhood and to seek relief through the judicial appellate process.

Public and Social Media Reaction

The news of Dr. Yasmin Rashid’s 10-year prison term has generated intense debate in Pakistan. PTI supporters and many commentators on social media expressed shock at the severity of the sentence, given that it stems from a political protest. For example, one online commenter reacted by writing that they were “truly shocked” and incredulous that someone could get 10 years in jail for a protest. The verdict has fed into an ongoing discussion about the proportionality of punishments meted out to PTI members. Critics of the government’s approach argue that peaceful (if angry) protesters are being treated on par with violent criminals, whereas authorities insist that the May 9 rioters crossed red lines by attacking state and military property.

Beyond social media, human rights organizations and neutral observers have raised concerns as well. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) previously urged due process and transparency in handling May 9 cases, warning against collective punishment or abuse of anti-terror laws. Internationally, there is wariness about Pakistan’s tactics in dealing with dissent; for instance, when dozens of civilians were convicted by military courts for the May 9 incidents, foreign governments and rights groups criticized the use of military tribunals for civilian trials. Although Dr. Yasmin Rashid was tried in a civilian ATC, her harsh sentence is cited by PTI’s supporters as evidence of a “witch-hunt” against the party. On the other hand, many Pakistanis who oppose PTI have applauded the ruling, arguing that it’s a long-overdue example of the rule of law asserting itself. Television news segments and op-eds have debated whether the punishment is commensurate with the crime: supporters of the verdict say that attacking state symbols merits stern action, while detractors counter that the state is setting a dangerous precedent by treating political protesters as terrorists. Overall, the public reaction highlights Pakistan’s polarized political climate – with Yasmin Rashid’s fate becoming a new symbol of the deep divide in how citizens interpret justice and democracy in the country.

Historical and Political Context of the Case

Dr. Yasmin Rashid’s sentencing cannot be seen in isolation – it is part of a much broader post-May 9 crackdown on PTI and its leadership. After Imran Khan’s ouster from power in April 2022 and especially following the May 9 riots, the incumbent government (and the powerful military establishment) undertook sweeping measures to neutralize PTI’s street power and organization. Security forces arrested virtually the entire top tier of PTI, with reports of mass detentions of workers and mid-level leaders across the country. Many detained PTI members, including women and youth, were charged under stringent laws such as the Anti-Terrorism Act and even the Army Act in cases involving military sites. In an extraordinary move, military courts were invoked to try civilians accused of attacking army installations – something Pakistan had not done in a political context in recent memory. The army, asserting its constitutional authority to protect its facilities, proceeded against dozens of suspects in military tribunals. By late 2023, at least 25 civilians had been convicted by a military court (including Imran Khan’s nephew) and handed sentences ranging from 2 to 10 years, and shortly thereafter 60 more individuals were convicted on similar charges by military tribunals. (These military court proceedings were briefly paused after the Supreme Court took up the issue, but the apex court later allowed pending cases to reach judgment.) In early 2024, a batch of 19 convicted PTI supporters had their military-court sentences pardoned upon mercy appeals – a gesture that PTI decried as insufficient and selective.

Meanwhile, in civilian anti-terrorism courts, hundreds of PTI workers have been facing trials for arson, assault, and sedition related to the May 9 events. The conviction of Dr. Yasmin Rashid in Lahore is one of the highest-profile judgments yet in these cases, underscoring that even senior PTI figures are not being spared. These legal actions have drastically altered Pakistan’s political landscape. PTI, which was the country’s ruling party until April 2022, has been effectively debilitated: scores of its prominent members are either imprisoned, on the run, or have defected under pressure (with many publicly quitting the party in the aftermath of May 9). Imran Khan himself remains incarcerated on multiple charges – from corruption to alleged leaks of state secrets – which have kept him behind bars continuously since August 2023. The crackdown has drawn criticism from opposition and civil society as a witch-hunt intended to dismantle PTI before the next general elections. The government, however, defends its actions as a necessary response to what it calls “anti-state” violence, insisting that no one is above the law and that those who attacked the state must face consequences. This tug-of-war between security imperatives and democratic norms forms the backdrop to Yasmin Rashid’s case, making it a bellwether for Pakistan’s direction. Will the country uphold the convictions as a sign of rule of law against violence, or will higher courts overturn some sentences in the name of justice and political reconciliation? The coming months, especially as appeals are heard, will be crucial in answering that question.

Conclusion

Dr. Yasmin Rashid’s 10-year prison sentence is a landmark outcome in the saga of the May 9, 2023 riots – a decision that resonates far beyond one individual. It illustrates the Pakistani state’s uncompromising stance toward the events of that day, signaling that even veteran politicians will be penalized severely if found complicit in attacking public property or inciting unrest. The case has been shaped by extraordinary circumstances: a former ruling party now in disarray, an establishment determined to reassert its authority, and a judiciary navigating both legal and political pressures. Yasmin Rashid’s conviction, along with similar verdicts against other PTI leaders, has effectively sidelined key opposition voices, at least for now. PTI and human rights observers contend that these trials have fallen short of fair standards and serve to settle political scores. The government, on the other hand, maintains that justice is simply taking its course in response to egregious acts of violence. As appeals move to higher courts, the final outcome – whether the sentences are upheld, reduced, or overturned – will have significant implications for Pakistan’s political reconciliation and the rule of law. For the moment, Dr. Yasmin Rashid remains behind bars, emblematic of the deep turmoil that engulfed Pakistan’s politics post-Imran Khan’s arrest. Her sentencing has become a defining episode in the country’s ongoing struggle between protest and authority, one that will be recorded in the political archives of Pakistan as a reflection of these contentious times.

The Government of Pakistan has decided to hand over the airport’s operations to a United Arab Emirates (UAE) entity under a new long-term agreement. This marks the first time a major Pakistani airport will be operated by a foreign partner, aiming to bring international expertise and investment into the country’s aviation sector.

Background: Plan to Outsource Major Airports

The idea of outsourcing Pakistan’s major airports has been in motion for several years. In December 2022, then-Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government decided to invite international operators to run the Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi airports in a bid to attract foreign investment and improve services. It was envisioned that reputed operators would be engaged under a public-private partnership (PPP) model for 20–25 years. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), part of the World Bank Group, was brought on as a consultant to guide this process. The goal was to modernize airport facilities and implement world-class standards for passengers while generating foreign exchange for Pakistan’s economy.

By mid-2023, the focus narrowed to Islamabad International Airport as the first to be outsourced. On July 21, 2023, Aviation Minister Khawaja Saad Rafique announced on the floor of the National Assembly that Islamabad International Airport would be outsourced for 15 years. He clarified the scope: core air navigation services and runway control would remain with the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), while “the rest will be outsourced” to a private operator. This meant that terminal operations, passenger services, and other commercial activities would be handled by the new operator, but air traffic control and security oversight would stay under Pakistani authority. The minister emphasized that this step was in line with global best practices, noting that many countries (including neighboring India, and airports like Istanbul and Madinah) have successfully engaged private operators for airport management.

Initial plans and assurances:

The government stressed that outsourcing did not equate to privatization or sale of national assets. Saad Rafique categorically stated that the airport was not being sold or mortgaged, and that no employees would lose their jobs as a result of the outsourcing. He assured lawmakers that all CAA staff at Islamabad Airport would have job security and continue to receive their salaries according to law. The outsourcing was framed as a move to improve efficiency and service quality, not a cost-cutting exercise. “No employee will be rendered jobless,” the minister repeated, countering fears of layoffs. At that stage, the plan was to conduct competitive bidding among interested international firms — the minister revealed that a dozen companies had shown interest, and the process would follow Pakistan’s procurement and PPP authority rules for transparency.

Timeline of Developments and Changes

Late 2022 – Decision and PPP Framework:

The formal decision to pursue airport outsourcing took place in late 2022 under the previous coalition government. A high-level meeting chaired by the Prime Minister approved the plan to engage international airport operators for 20–25 years and instructed the Public–Private Partnership Authority to initiate the process. The rationale was to bring in foreign direct investment and “world-class facilities” for travelers. The Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore airports – being the country’s busiest gateways – were selected for the first phase.

2023 – Bidding Process and Political Transition:

In early 2023, preparatory steps were taken: the Finance Ministry disclosed in March that efforts to outsource airports had begun, and by late June the government confirmed Islamabad airport would be taken up first. The CAA briefed a National Assembly panel that the outsourcing was “in motion” and proceeding under the PPP Authority’s framework. Over July–August 2023, significant events unfolded: the Aviation Minister’s July announcement in Parliament was followed by labor unrest in August. CAA employees, alarmed by the outsourcing plan, staged protests at major airports including Islamabad. On August 4, 2023, CAA staff at Islamabad Airport held a strike in the terminals, wearing black armbands and carrying placards declaring “outsourcing not acceptable”. Protesters raised slogans against the government’s decision, and their demonstration caused disruption for airlines and passengers at the airport. The CAA unions demanded written assurances about job security and terms of service, even after meeting government ministers who pledged to address their concerns. Unions warned of escalating actions (including halting airport operations) if their reservations were not resolved in writing.

Despite worker apprehensions, the official process moved forward into late 2023 and 2024. A Steering Committee on outsourcing (formed in June 2023) oversaw the hiring of IFC as transaction advisor and finalized the project scope and support measures to attract investors. The Islamabad Airport PPP was formally advertised for international bidding, initially setting mid-July 2024 as the deadline for bid submissions. The bidding followed a single-stage, two-envelope procedure (technical and financial bids) under Public Procurement rules.

Mid-2024 – Regulatory Hurdles:

As the bidding phase progressed, Pakistan’s procurement regulator raised concerns. In June 2024, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) refused to grant an exemption that the Aviation Ministry had sought in order to modify the bidding process. Specifically, the ministry wanted to add a second round of financial bidding (to allow top bidders to improve their offers) to maximize the deal’s value. However, PPRA noted that such a second-round auction was not provided for in the standard rules and declined to endorse bypassing the usual procedures. This meant the authorities had to stick to the original bidding format or find another route. The Secretary of Aviation explained that the outsourcing of Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore airports was initiated under the PPP Act on the direction of the Prime Minister in Dec 2022, and that Islamabad would be the pilot project to be followed by Karachi and Lahore. The PPRA decision was a setback to tweaking the bidding for higher returns, reflecting the complexities of balancing transparency with the government’s urgency for funds.

Late 2024 – Bid Outcome and Foreign Interest:

By October 2024, the bidding process yielded a single serious bidder. According to news reports, a Turkish consortium emerged as the only qualified bidder for Islamabad International Airport’s operations contract. The consortium (comprising Terminal Yapi, and companies ERG İnşaat and ERG UK) reportedly submitted the highest offer and passed the technical evaluation. In fact, two other bidding teams were disqualified for late submissions, leaving the Turkish group as the sole contender. This outcome later became controversial: one competing consortium alleged they were arbitrarily excluded, accusing officials of favoritism towards the rival bidder. The disgruntled party even lodged a complaint and went to court over the tender process, claiming procedural irregularities and lack of transparency in the bid submission timing. Despite these objections, the Aviation Ministry proceeded to evaluate the Turkish bid.

In early January 2025, financial bids were opened, and it was revealed that the Turkish consortium’s offer fell short of the government’s expectations. The group offered to pay 47% of airport revenue to the government, against a minimum threshold of 56% that authorities had set. In other words, the sole bidder’s financial bid was below the desired concession fee level. Pakistan’s newly formed Pakistan Airports Authority (PAA) confirmed this outcome and referred the matter to the IFC advisors for further evaluation. The shortfall was significant, signaling that the bid might not be financially acceptable to Pakistan without renegotiation. Indeed, reports in Pakistani media indicated that the government was unhappy with the terms and unwilling to settle for a “below minimum” offer. By early 2025, amid these developments, Pakistan’s economic managers were also pursuing other privatization initiatives (such as selling a stake in Pakistan International Airlines) as part of a broader IMF-supported reform agenda.

Cancellation of PPP Tender:

Facing a single sub-par bid and procedural challenges, the federal cabinet decided to cancel the Islamabad Airport outsourcing tender in the first quarter of 2025. According to official sources cited in press reports, the cabinet scrapped the PPP tender due to disagreements over the revenue-sharing model – essentially, the government and the bidder could not agree on financial terms that met the set benchmark. This marked a pivot in strategy: rather than re-tendering the project through open competition (which had proven lengthy and contentious), Pakistan opted to explore a government-to-government (G2G) arrangement for the airport.

Mid-2025 – Shift to G2G Deal with UAE: By July 2025, it became public that the Pakistan government was finalizing a plan to hand over Islamabad International Airport’s operations to the UAE through direct negotiations, bypassing the open bidding process. On July 22, 2025, Pakistani media reports confirmed that the federal government decided to forgo competitive bidding for Islamabad Airport and instead pursue a bilateral agreement with the UAE. Sources in the Privatization Commission and Aviation Division indicated that this G2G deal is aimed at expediting the outsourcing, after the earlier tender under the PPP mode did not yield a satisfactory result. The Ministries of Finance, Defence, and Aviation were instructed to jointly develop a detailed framework for the agreement, to be presented for approval to the federal cabinet and also cleared with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Once the framework is agreed internally, it will be shared with the UAE authorities to hammer out the final terms. This high-level involvement (including IMF oversight) underscores the economic importance of the deal; indeed, outsourcing the airport is one of several privatization moves Pakistan has committed to in the current fiscal year as part of reforms to stabilize the economy.

Notably, this development comes after increasing strategic cooperation between Pakistan and the UAE in various sectors. In November 2024, Pakistan and UAE officials had already signed four Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) covering collaboration in customs, railways, airport infrastructure, maritime shipping, and logistics. These MoUs, exchanged during a visit of a UAE delegation led by Dr. Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi (UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Trade) in Islamabad, signaled the UAE’s interest in Pakistan’s infrastructure development. The aviation-related MoU specifically spoke of exploring upgrades for Pakistan’s international airports. It was signed with Abu Dhabi Ports (AD Ports) Group, a major UAE state-owned enterprise, indicating that UAE’s involvement could come via such government-linked companies. This backdrop suggests that the groundwork for a Pakistan-UAE partnership in managing airports was laid months before the formal decision in mid-2025.

As of late July 2025, the Islamabad Airport G2G outsourcing agreement is in the finalization stage. The Pakistani cabinet’s approval and an IMF nod are expected to pave the way for signing a deal with the UAE in the coming months. The timeline for the handover has not been officially announced yet, but officials hint that the process will move quickly once agreements are in place, given Pakistan’s pressing economic needs. The concession period under the UAE deal is also yet to be confirmed; however, it is likely to be similar to the earlier plan (around 15 years, extendable) unless renegotiated otherwise. In summary, after a year of trying the conventional privatization route, Pakistan pivoted to a state-to-state partnership model, betting on the UAE’s interest and capital to achieve its airport outsourcing goal more swiftly.

Scope and Nature of the UAE Handover Deal

Under the impending Pakistan–UAE agreement, Islamabad International Airport will remain under Pakistani ownership but its operations and management will be run by a UAE-appointed operator. In essence, this is an operations concession, not a sale or transfer of property rights. All land and core assets of the airport will continue to belong to Pakistan’s CAA or the federal government, while the UAE side will likely invest in and manage the facility for the duration of the contract, sharing revenues with Pakistan.

Key aspects of the deal’s scope include:

• Term of Agreement: The original plan set by Pakistan was a 15-year outsourcing term for Islamabad Airport. This was confirmed by the Aviation Minister and formed the basis of the PPP tender. It is expected that the G2G deal will mirror a similar multi-year term (potentially 15 years, or possibly up to 20 years as initially envisioned in 2022). Such a period gives the foreign operator enough time to recoup investments and profit, while eventually returning the asset to Pakistan’s control. The agreement may include options to extend the term by mutual consent or performance-based triggers, but details remain to be seen.
  
• Responsibilities of the UAE Operator: The UAE entity (possibly a consortium led by AD Ports Group or another state-owned aviation company from the Emirates) will take charge of airport operations, maintenance, and commercial functions. This covers passenger terminal management, ground handling coordination, retail and duty-free concessions, parking, cleanliness, and potentially expansion/upgrades of terminal facilities. Essentially, the private operator will run the airport’s day-to-day business and service delivery, aiming to improve efficiency and customer experience. Past documents showed that even in the PPP model, the concessionaire was expected to “design, finance, build, rehabilitate, operate, maintain and transfer” the airport infrastructure, implying capital investments to expand or modernize the facilities. The UAE partner will likely inject funds for new infrastructure, technology (such as modern baggage systems or e-gates), and service training to meet international standards.
  
• What Stays with Pakistan: As clarified by officials, certain sovereign and sensitive functions are not being outsourced. Air traffic control, runway management, and airside navigational services will remain with the CAA/Pakistani authorities. This ensures that Pakistan retains control over aviation security, flight operations (takeoffs/landings), and compliance with international aviation regulations. Additionally, areas involving immigration, customs, and overall airport security (such as Airport Security Force) will continue to be handled by Pakistani government agencies. The foreign operator’s role will be focused on commercial and operational efficiency, not on border control or national security aspects.
  
• Revenue Sharing and Investment: The deal is expected to follow a revenue-sharing model where the UAE operator will pay the Pakistani government a concession fee or share of the revenue earned from the airport’s operations. In the earlier tender, Pakistan had set a minimum requirement that 56% of revenue go to the government. The sole bid offered 47%, which was deemed too low. In the G2G negotiation, Pakistan will aim for favorable terms—possibly a similar or higher revenue share, or a large upfront investment from the UAE, or a combination of both. Since this is being handled as a government-to-government transaction, the financial arrangement might also involve broader economic cooperation (for example, UAE investment packages or aid that go beyond just the airport). UAE’s commitment of $10 billion investment in Pakistan, announced in early 2023-24, forms the backdrop in which this airport deal sits. The exact financial structure (whether a lump-sum concession payment, annual royalty, or profit split) will become clear once the agreement is signed. Pakistani officials have signaled that faster implementation and strategic alignment are priorities, suggesting they might accept a reasonable offer in exchange for swift execution.
  
• Regulatory and Legal Framework: This handover will likely be executed under Pakistan’s new Inter-Governmental Commercial Transactions Act (if applicable) or a special arrangement approved by the Cabinet. In July 2025, Pakistan’s government formed a Cabinet Committee on Inter-Governmental Transactions to expedite deals like this. By routing it through a G2G agreement, the authorities can bypass certain procurement rules (as noted earlier) and directly negotiate terms. It still requires transparency and oversight – hence IMF’s involvement in reviewing the framework and the federal Cabinet’s approval. The final contract will stipulate performance indicators, service quality benchmarks, and penalties to ensure the operator meets international standards in running the airport.
  
• Involvement of UAE Entities: While the Pakistani government has not publicly named the UAE counterpart yet, clues point to Abu Dhabi’s state-linked companies. AD Ports Group (which oversees ports, and has aviation ambitions) is a prime candidate since it signed the MoUs regarding airports. Another possibility is Dubai or Abu Dhabi airport operators or sovereign funds partnering in the venture. For instance, Dubai Airports (which manages Dubai International and Al Maktoum Airport) or Abu Dhabi Airports Company could be involved via a G2G understanding. Moreover, Emirates airline or related UAE aviation firms might indirectly benefit if they get improved slots or facilities out of a UAE-run Islamabad Airport (though operations will be separate from airline ownership). The presence of Sheikh Ahmed Dalmook Al Maktoum (a UAE investor) in the November 2024 delegation hints at interest at high levels. In any case, the agreement will be between governments, with the UAE likely delegating actual operation to one of its expert entities in the aviation sector.

In summary, the nature of the deal is that of a concession/lease of the airport’s operations to the UAE for a defined period. Pakistan retains ownership and strategic control, while the UAE side will infuse capital and managerial know-how to run the airport more profitably. This approach aligns with what Pakistan’s Aviation Division originally intended – to emulate models where governments retain critical functions but leverage private (or in this case, foreign state) partners for commercial airport management. The hope is that this will upgrade Islamabad Airport’s facilities, bring it up to “world’s best operating practices,” and relieve the financial burden on the national exchequer. It effectively moves Pakistan’s aviation infrastructure into a partnership with a friendly Gulf country, blending privatization with bilateral cooperation.

Official Confirmations from Pakistan and UAE

The move to hand over Islamabad Airport has been confirmed by various officials in Pakistan, though the messaging evolved over time:

• Pakistan’s Aviation Ministry: The initial confirmation came from Khawaja Saad Rafique (Aviation Minister in 2023), who officially disclosed the outsourcing plan in Parliament. His detailed statement in July 2023 outlined the terms (15-year outsourcing, no job cuts, CAA to retain certain functions). This statement on the National Assembly floor is a matter of public record and demonstrated political approval at the highest level for involving foreign operators at Islamabad Airport.
  
• Privatization Commission and Finance Ministry: In 2025, as the strategy shifted to a G2G deal, information emerged via briefings from the Privatization Commission and Finance Ministry. Although there was initially no standalone press conference announcing “we are giving the airport to the UAE,” leaked official communications to media made it clear. Reports citing official sources on July 22, 2025 stated that relevant ministries have been directed to prepare the framework for a UAE agreement. This implies that at the federal government level, a decision in principle was taken (likely in a Cabinet Committee) and ministries are executing it. The requirement of IMF approval was also mentioned, which Finance Ministry officials would oversee, highlighting that even international stakeholders like the IMF are being kept in the loop.
  
• Caretaker Government Stance: After August 2023, Pakistan was run by a caretaker government (as the elected government’s term ended). The caretaker Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar and his cabinet carried forward the outsourcing initiative, treating it as part of continuity of economic policy. During a visit to the UAE in November 2023, PM Kakar discussed investment cooperation in fields including aviation. The Foreign Office had announced that Kakar’s trip would include signing MoUs in sectors like “Energy, Port Operations Projects, … Aviation, and Banking”. Indeed, the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) press release on November 26, 2023 confirmed that Pakistan and UAE would sign agreements to boost collaboration in aviation among other areas. This indicates an official blessing at the top level for engaging UAE on airport projects. After the bid cancellation, the caretaker setup greenlit direct negotiations — a decision likely taken in early 2025 by economic managers and conveyed to the UAE side in diplomatic talks.
  
• Statements by Ministers/Officials: While an explicit public quote like “We are handing Islamabad Airport to UAE” is yet to come from a minister (probably awaiting final deal signing), there have been related statements. For example, the caretaker Privatization Minister (or relevant adviser) has talked about expediting privatization of PIA and other entities, which includes airports. The Director General of Pakistan Airports Authority and bid committee chairman, Sadiq ur Rehman, acknowledged the outcome of the bidding and that further steps were being considered with advisors. This technical confirmation hinted that alternatives (like the G2G route) were on the table after the bidding setback. Additionally, the IMF’s involvement itself is a form of confirmation: Pakistan’s IMF program (a $7 billion Extended Fund Facility) lists privatization of assets like airports and PIA as structural benchmarks. The IMF had recommended outsourcing airports as part of revenue-generation efforts. Thus, when Pakistani authorities say the framework will be vetted by the IMF, it shows an official endorsement and commitment at the policy level.
  
• UAE Authorities: The UAE side has not issued a dedicated public statement specifically about taking over Islamabad Airport’s operation yet. However, there have been positive signals from UAE officials in broader contexts. During the November 8, 2024 MoU signing in Islamabad, UAE Minister Dr. Thani Al Zeyoudi expressed keen interest in expanding UAE’s investment in Pakistan’s transport and aviation sectors, praising the opportunities in shipping, ports, logistics, and digitization of customs. The UAE ambassador to Pakistan and executives like Captain Mohamed Al Shamisi (CEO of AD Ports) were part of that delegation, indicating high-level attention to Pakistan’s airports. We can infer that behind closed doors, UAE representatives have confirmed their willingness to take up Islamabad Airport as a flagship project. In fact, soon after reports of the G2G deal surfaced, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) sent teams to inspect Pakistani airports’ security measures. In July 2025, a UAE aviation security team visited Islamabad and Karachi airports and declared the security arrangements “satisfactory” for UAE-bound flights. This can be read as the UAE doing due diligence, a form of tacit confirmation that they are preparing to get involved operationally. An official from Pakistan’s CAA noted that “the Emirati team is reviewing aviation security measures at Islamabad airport” as part of this process.
  
• Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs): The MoUs signed between Pakistan and UAE (through AD Ports Group) in late 2024 serve as quasi-official confirmation of intent. According to Pakistan’s state news agency (APP), those MoUs established a framework to explore collaboration in airport infrastructure development. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif (at that time) publicly stated that UAE’s increased “investment footprint” in Pakistan was welcomed, and the UAE delegation similarly indicated satisfaction with existing investments and a desire to do more. This mutual acknowledgment, recorded in official press releases, signals that both governments are on the same page regarding projects like the Islamabad Airport outsourcing. Essentially, while a formal concession contract is pending, the groundwork has been officially laid and endorsed at the highest levels.

In conclusion, multiple confirmations from Pakistan’s side – parliamentary announcements, cabinet-level decisions, and press statements – have established that Islamabad Airport’s operations will be outsourced. The decision to partner specifically with the UAE has been revealed through government sources and aligned with previously signed MoUs, even if a direct quote from a UAE official about “taking over Islamabad Airport” isn’t public yet. Both governments have, through their actions and agreements, demonstrated clear intent to move forward with this collaboration. As such, there is little ambiguity remaining: barring any last-minute changes, Islamabad International Airport is on course to be run by a UAE-linked operator, with the blessing of Pakistani authorities and the knowledge of institutions like the IMF.

Public and Political Reactions in Pakistan

The plan to hand over Islamabad International Airport to a foreign entity – particularly without a traditional bidding process – has sparked a range of reactions within Pakistan, from cautious approval to outright criticism. Key stakeholders including politicians, journalists, aviation experts, airport employees, and the traveling public have all voiced opinions:

• Government and Ruling Circles: Members of the government (current and former) have largely defended the move as a necessary step to improve services and relieve financial strain. Supporters argue that Pakistan’s airports have long underperformed in service quality and revenue generation, and that bringing in an experienced international operator will upgrade facilities and bring in fresh investment. Saad Rafique’s impassioned speech in 2023 epitomized this pro-reform stance: he insisted Pakistan must not “remain in the stone age” while the whole world leverages private operators for efficiency. Officials also point out that the outsourcing is not privatization in the traditional sense, but a management contract – hence in their view it avoids the pitfalls of selling national assets while still achieving modernization. The caretaker government has framed the G2G deal as part of its mandate to stabilize the economy. They emphasize that attracting Gulf investment is crucial and that the UAE is a trusted partner which has supported Pakistan in difficult times. There is also a sense of urgency communicated by officials: Pakistan cannot afford delays when its foreign reserves are low and an IMF program is underway; thus, politically, they present the airport deal as a timely strategic choice.
  
• Opposition Parties and Politicians: Opposition reaction has been mixed, often colored by the broader political environment. No major political party has outright opposed improving airports, but concerns about transparency and sovereignty have been raised. Politicians from parties not in power (for instance, the PTI when it was in opposition in 2023, or others) have questioned why a profitable asset is being outsourced. Some have accused the government of “selling out” national assets under foreign pressure. There’s also critique about skipping the bidding process – opposition leaders and independent commentators argue that foregoing open competition can breed non-transparency and potential corruption. The Express Tribune reported allegations that the previous bidding was manipulated to favor a particular foreign consortium, a claim that fed into the narrative that due process was compromised. Those allegations, although specific to the PPP tender, have strengthened calls from opposition for any G2G deal to be scrutinized thoroughly. Additionally, some politicians worry about the precedent this sets: today Islamabad Airport, tomorrow possibly other strategic assets – a slippery slope argument. However, it should be noted that the initial airport outsourcing idea was floated under a PML-N-led government, so mainstream parties like PML-N and PPP (which were part of that government) have been generally supportive. The criticism mainly comes from nationalist or left-leaning voices who are skeptical of privatization and from the PTI’s rank-and-file who oppose policies of the former government. There is also an undertone in opposition rhetoric that by involving a foreign country (UAE) directly, Pakistan might be compromising some sovereignty or leverage over a key installation; though the government rebuts this by pointing to dozens of countries that have foreign or private airport operators without issues.
  
• Aviation Experts and Journalists: Pakistan’s aviation experts and prominent journalists have offered analysis both for and against the move. Some aviation analysts highlight that Islamabad’s new airport (opened in 2018) has not reached its potential, and that a professional operator could improve efficiency, increase air traffic, and generate more revenue. They often cite examples of regional successes (like airports in India run by GMR or Adani groups, or the Istanbul and Medina airports run via international consortia) as models that Pakistan can emulate to its benefit. On the other hand, seasoned commentators have flagged valid concerns: An op-ed in Dawn (Pakistan’s leading English daily) argued that outsourcing major airports might “risk national security” since airports are sensitive infrastructures. The author (a former CAA employee) pointed out that after a serious terror attack on Karachi Airport in 2014, keeping tight domestic control over airports is a security imperative. Another common point in expert critiques is that Islamabad Airport is actually a revenue-generating asset (a “golden egg” in CAA’s portfolio) – privatizing profits while socializing losses is seen as counter-intuitive if the airport is doing well financially. They suggest the government should instead privatize loss-making entities (like the chronically unprofitable PIA or steel mills) and not a relatively profitable airport. Additionally, concerns about higher costs to passengers have been raised. Experience in other countries shows private operators seek to maximize returns, sometimes by increasing airline charges or passenger fees. Indeed, the Dawn op-ed cited how privatization of Delhi and Mumbai airports in India led to “widespread criticism” due to steep hikes in user tariffs, deterring the Indian government from privatizing more airports for a time. Pakistani journalists fear a similar scenario where an international operator might raise parking fees, airport taxes, rents on shops, etc., which could indirectly make flying costlier for the public. However, others counter that improved service and facilities might justify slightly higher fees, and regulation can cap any excessive charges.
  
• Public Sentiment and Passengers: Among the general public and frequent travelers, reactions are divided. Many air travelers in Pakistan have long complained about the quality of services at airports – issues like slow customs/immigration, lack of cleanliness, limited amenities, and poor customer service are common at even the new Islamabad Airport. For these passengers, the idea that a reputed foreign operator (potentially the same people who run Dubai or Abu Dhabi’s airports) could take over is a welcome one. On social media, some Pakistanis express hope that this will bring “Dubai-level” efficiency and comfort to Islamabad. They anticipate better duty-free shops, faster check-ins, and more international airlines coming in due to improved management. On the flip side, national pride and skepticism temper these hopes. Social media platforms saw sarcastic and critical comments when news of the UAE handover plan broke. For example, one user quipped, “Why not hand over the whole country to the UAE?”, reflecting a cynicism that the government was outsourcing its responsibilities too freely. Others on Facebook and X (Twitter) questioned whether this was effectively a loss of sovereignty at a key gateway, with some conspiracy-tinged remarks about foreign control. There are also fears of job losses and mistreatment of local staff, which resonates with the employees’ own concerns. Passengers, while wanting better service, express solidarity with the notion that Pakistani workers should not be laid off en masse or replaced by outsiders. The government’s repeated assurances on job security are meant to allay exactly that fear.
  
• Airport Employees and Unions: The most vocal opposition has come from within the CAA’s rank and file. For the thousands of CAA employees who operate Pakistan’s airports, outsourcing is seen as a direct threat to their jobs, benefits, and status. Unions representing these workers (such as the Joint Action Committee of CAA Employees) have held multiple demonstrations. In addition to the August 2023 strikes, CAA employees wore black bands and held protest rallies in 2024 as the outsourcing progressed, at one point threatening to halt air traffic control operations if their demands were ignored. Their demands included written guarantees that no employee would be laid off or forced to transfer unwillingly, and that pensions and seniority would be protected under any new operator. The workers also demanded clarity on whether they would remain CAA employees deputed to the private operator or be absorbed by the new entity – these HR issues remain sensitive. The government did engage with union representatives; a Cabinet Committee including senior ministers met them and promised to address their reservations. Nonetheless, the unions remained distrustful until concrete agreements were reached. It’s likely that as part of the final deal with UAE, the government will draft an arrangement for staff (for example, the operator might be required to retain all existing staff for a certain period, and any new hiring or replacement would be through natural attrition). Despite their hardline stance, unions have also taken legal steps: a petition was filed in the Lahore High Court to stop the outsourcing on grounds of public interest and workers’ rights. The legal challenge hasn’t stopped the process but could influence how employee matters are handled.
  
• Opposition in Media Discourse: Pakistan’s vibrant media has hosted debates on this topic. TV talk shows have featured discussions about the pros and cons of the airport handover. Opposition politicians have used those platforms to accuse the government of acting under IMF dictation, since the IMF program explicitly mentions privatization of airports. They argue that national assets are being pawned off to meet IMF conditions. Some have also alluded to geopolitical angles, noting the UAE’s increasing influence in Pakistan’s economy and cautioning against over-reliance on one country. However, proponents in these debates highlight that the UAE has successfully run airports and ports around the world (for instance, DP World runs ports globally), and that their involvement could actually raise Pakistan’s profile as a safe investment destination. It’s also pointed out that other countries in the region have done similar G2G deals with Gulf states for infrastructure (e.g., Egypt and Saudi Arabia/UAE, or some African countries), so Pakistan’s move is not unprecedented.

Thus far, no large-scale public protests (beyond the CAA employees) have erupted solely against the Islamabad Airport deal – the issue remains somewhat technical for the average citizen. However, it is being closely watched as a test case of Pakistan’s privatization drive. Successful execution with clear benefits could swing public opinion favorably, whereas any missteps (like sudden job cuts or price hikes at the airport) would validate the critics’ fears.

For Passengers (Travelers): The intended impact of handing over Islamabad Airport to a UAE operator is overwhelmingly positive in terms of passenger experience. The new management is expected to introduce modern operational practices, upgraded facilities, and enhanced customer service. Travelers using Islamabad International Airport in the future may notice improvements such as: faster check-in and boarding processes (with better technology deployment), cleaner terminals and restrooms (as maintenance standards rise), a broader range of retail and dining options (since the private operator will seek to maximize commercial revenue by attracting reputable international brands and duty-free operators), and possibly more flight options. A well-managed airport can attract more international airlines to schedule flights, benefiting travelers with greater connectivity. Also, security processing and baggage handling could become smoother under experienced management that implements global best practices. Essentially, the airport experience could become closer to that of hubs like Dubai or Abu Dhabi – which is exactly the comparison many Pakistani travelers make.

Passengers may also see new value-added services: for instance, premium lounges might be expanded or improved, and services like airport Wi-Fi, mobile app integration for flight info, and special assistance for disabled or elderly passengers might get better. There is hope that flight punctuality could improve too, as ground handling and apron management become more efficient under the new operator’s protocols.

However, there are also potential downsides for passengers to be mindful of. Private operators aim to increase profitability, which sometimes leads to higher fees that can trickle down to travelers. This could mean increased airport charges included in ticket prices (departure fees, etc.), costlier parking fees, or more expensive concessions. As noted by observers, the experience of airport privatizations elsewhere has occasionally led to “steep hikes in user tariffs”. If not regulated, the operator might raise rents on airlines and shops, and those entities could pass on costs to consumers. Pakistan’s aviation regulators will need to keep an eye on this to ensure the airport remains affordable. It’s worth noting that under the PPP model, Pakistan’s CAA would have set a “reference tariff” regime to cap charges; a similar mechanism should be in place in the G2G contract to protect consumers.

Another impact area is security and convenience. Given that UAE airports are known for strict but efficient security, passengers might experience changes in security screening processes. A UAE-linked management might introduce more advanced scanners or methods (for instance, Smart Gates for outbound immigration, which UAE uses for expats). The recent visit by UAE’s GCAA team suggests that security standards will be aligned with UAE expectations, potentially increasing trust for flights between Pakistan and the UAE. For passengers, this could mean smoother travel on UAE-bound flights if security protocols are harmonized, but it must be ensured that any changes do not inconvenience local travelers or violate Pakistani sovereignty in security matters.

On balance, most analysts believe passengers will benefit from a better-run airport: shorter queues, more amenities, and an overall more pleasant travel experience. International passengers and overseas Pakistanis in particular have reacted with some optimism – many recall the chaos during peak Hajj/Umrah seasons or holiday rush and hope a professional operator will bring order to that. As long as costs remain reasonable, public sentiment among travelers could turn positive once improvements become tangible.

For Airport Staff and Employees:

 The impact on staff is one of the most sensitive aspects of this entire deal. Islamabad International Airport (and CAA generally) employs a large workforce ranging from highly skilled air traffic controllers and engineers to ground staff, technicians, clerks, and service personnel. When a private (or foreign) operator takes charge, typically there are three possible outcomes for existing staff:

1. Retention under current terms: The new operator could agree to retain all current employees, who remain employees of CAA (or the new Pakistan Airports Authority) but are seconded to work under the operator’s management. Their salaries, benefits, and government job status would continue as before. The operator would coordinate work and possibly retrain staff, but not change their employment contracts. This model was somewhat hinted by the government’s promises that no one will be jobless and everyone will get their due salary. If this path is chosen, staff job security is intact, but the challenge is ensuring the workforce adapts to new performance standards. The operator might have limited ability to discipline or replace underperforming staff if they remain government employees, which can be a sticking point.
   
2. Transfer to operator’s payroll: Alternatively, the deal could stipulate that all or most employees are transferred to the operator (with some guarantees). For example, the operator might inherit the staff for at least a certain number of years, maintaining their pay levels and benefits. Over time, staff might be offered new contracts or incentivized to shift to the operator’s terms. This approach can lead to improved productivity if managed well, but it is exactly what the unions fear – being moved out of secure government jobs into the private sector. Even if salaries initially stay the same, things like pension, civil service protections, and long-term stability might change. The government so far appears reluctant to do a forced transfer, given the strong union resistance. Any such move would need careful handling, possibly generous voluntary retirement schemes or options for those unwilling to transfer.
   
3. Gradual workforce changes: In many concessions globally, the incoming operator keeps the existing staff at the start, but over time uses attrition to resize or reshape the workforce. Retirements, voluntary separations, or reassignments to other CAA roles could reduce numbers, and the operator might bring in some of its own experienced managers. The Pakistan Air Line Pilots’ Association (PALPA) and other aviation bodies have asked that locals not be sidelined from key roles. The likely scenario is a mixed management team – a few top posts (like CEO of the airport, CFO, etc.) might be filled by UAE-appointed professionals, while most operational staff remain Pakistanis. Training and re-skilling programs are expected for the staff to learn new systems and meet the benchmarks set by the operator.

From an employee perspective, the uncertainty is high until the exact terms are disclosed. The government’s repeated public assurances are intended to ease their anxiety. There are also legal safeguards; for instance, the Pakistani government can write into the contract that the new operator cannot lay off any workers for a defined period (say, first 5 years) and that if any redundancies are later needed, they must be done with compensation and government approval. It’s also possible that an Employee Association representative is included in oversight committees to voice worker concerns during the transition.

For those staff who do stay on, one positive impact could be capacity building. Working under an international operator could expose Pakistani staff to advanced training, new technologies, and modern management practices. This can enhance their skills and career growth. If the venture is successful, these employees would become pioneers of a new culture in Pakistan’s aviation industry, potentially eligible for performance-based rewards which are rare in the public sector.

However, morale during the transition is a concern – prolonged protests or distrust can hurt airport operations. Already in mid-2023, protests led to flight disruptions at Islamabad. It will be crucial for the transition team (both from Pakistan’s side and UAE’s side) to engage with employees, possibly offering incentives such as salary increments or bonuses upon successful handover, to win their cooperation.

In summary, passengers are poised to benefit through better services, while staff are apprehensive but protected (at least initially) by government assurances. The true impact on staff will unfold over years and depends on how the new management balances efficiency with the welfare of the existing workforce. If done correctly, Islamabad Airport could become a model where employees are treated fairly and retrained rather than replaced, setting an example for future such partnerships. If mishandled, there could be labor strife which would ironically undercut the very efficiency gains the deal aims to achieve. The government’s credibility is on the line with respect to its promise: “no employee will be rendered jobless”. All eyes will be on the implementation to see that this promise is honored in letter and spirit.

Media Coverage and Statements on Social Media

The developments regarding Islamabad Airport’s outsourcing have received extensive media coverage both in Pakistan and in the Gulf region, as well as considerable attention on social media platforms like Twitter (X) and Facebook. Here’s a breakdown of how the media narrative has played out:

• Pakistani Mainstream Media: Leading news outlets in Pakistan have been covering this story since its inception. Newspapers such as Dawn, The Express Tribune, Business Recorder, The News, and Pakistan Today (Profit) have published news articles, analyses, and editorials on the subject. Early on, Dawn reported the government decisions and the minister’s announcement in detail, setting a factual tone. Business Recorder provided insight into the regulatory discussions, like the PPRA’s refusal to allow special bidding measures. The Express Tribune not only reported the government line but also gave space to criticism – for example, their October 2024 report headlined “Govt outsources Islamabad airport to ‘favoured’ bidder” highlighted allegations of impropriety in the bidding process. This shows how media outlets balanced the official narrative with investigative angles.
  
  As the shift to the UAE deal emerged, outlets like ProPakistani (a business/tech news site) and Dialogue Pakistan quickly broke the story that the government would bypass open bidding in favor of a G2G agreement. These reports, citing sources in the Privatization Commission, came out around July 21-22, 2025 and were widely circulated online. They essentially confirmed what had been speculated after the bidding cancellation: that the UAE was stepping in as the likely partner. Television media also picked up the story – channels such as Geo News, ARY News, Dunya News aired segments on the airport handover. Dunya News, for instance, ran a news package titled “Pakistan, UAE finalizing government-to-government deal for Islamabad Airport” on July 22, 2025, which summarized the situation for TV audiences. These TV reports often feature correspondents giving the latest updates from Islamabad, sometimes including short sound bites from aviation officials or economic experts.
  
  It’s worth noting that Urdu-language media (which has a broader audience in Pakistan) also covered this extensively. Outlets like Jang and Express published Urdu news stories, and TV channels had talk show discussions in Urdu debating the “faidey aur nuksaan” (pros and cons) of the airport’s privatization. This ensured the topic reached the general public and not just the English-speaking readership.
  
• Gulf and International Media: Given the UAE’s involvement, media in the Gulf showed interest. Arab News (which has a Pakistan edition) reported on Pakistan-UAE agreements, including the ones on airport infrastructure. Their reports tended to highlight the cooperative aspect and Pakistan’s eagerness for UAE investment. Gulf News and Khaleej Times (UAE-based) have also occasionally touched on Pakistan’s privatization efforts in context of PIA and infrastructure, though detailed stories on Islamabad Airport specifically have been limited. As the deal comes to fruition, it’s expected that The National (UAE’s prominent English daily) and other Gulf outlets will cover it from the UAE investment perspective, possibly interviewing UAE officials for their comments.
  
  Internationally, niche aviation industry publications and economic news services have been following the story. For example, CAPA – Centre for Aviation released analysis noting that the Islamabad Airport privatization had proven difficult and was pivoting toward a direct deal. Reuters and Bloomberg, which track Pakistan’s IMF program and reforms, also mentioned airport outsourcing as part of Pakistan’s privatization plans in reports about the country’s economic measures. These outlets provide a more neutral, fact-focused account geared to investors: e.g., highlighting that Pakistan aims to lease out the airport to raise funds and that UAE has a $7 billion IMF program context.
  
• Social Media (Twitter/X and Facebook): On social platforms, the conversation has been vibrant. Pakistani news outlets amplified their coverage via Twitter and Facebook posts. For instance, ProPakistani’s official X (Twitter) account posted: “Govt to Bypass Bidding Process to Handover Islamabad Airport to UAE” with a link to their article. This post, and similar ones by Dialogue Pakistan, garnered many replies and retweets. Users on X reacted with a mix of sarcasm, concern, and some support. Hashtags like #IslamabadAirport and #UAE popped up in trending discussions in Pakistan around the dates of major news breaks. Some users questioned the government’s decision-making (“Is anything going to be left owned by Pakistan?” one user asked rhetorically), while others tagged it as a smart move to “finally fix our airports.”
  
  Influential journalists on Twitter also weighed in. For example, a well-known journalist tweeted about the employee protests, saying it’s imperative to take workers into confidence or “we risk chaos at airports during transition.” Such comments indicate that those following the issue closely urge careful handling. On Facebook, where a lot of discourse happens in Urdu, posts by news pages (like the one by Startup Pakistan citing the plan) received comments such as the aforementioned “Why not hand over the whole country to UAE” in cynicism. Another commenter explained in Roman Urdu that “operations outsource kar rahay” (operations are being outsourced, not ownership), trying to clarify to others in the thread. This shows that on social media, there’s some attempt to correct misconceptions (that the entire airport is being “sold”) and to explain that it’s about outsourcing operations.
  
  Moreover, official government social media accounts have so far been relatively quiet on this specific airport deal – likely because it’s still under process. The Ministry of Aviation or the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority’s social channels have not made explicit posts about handing over the airport. They have, however, posted about improvements and investments in airports in general terms, which could be seen as laying ground for public acceptance. The Prime Minister’s Office social media posted about the MoUs with AD Ports in Nov 2024, highlighting potential benefits in broad terms (without mentioning “privatization”). Once the deal is signed, one can expect official announcements on these platforms to shape the narrative positively, emphasizing investment, jobs, and improved services.
  
• Narrative in Media: Pakistani media has largely presented the news as part of the government’s economic reform efforts, often mentioning it alongside PIA’s privatization and power sector privatizations. This framing ties the airport outsourcing to Pakistan’s need to meet IMF conditions and attract foreign exchange. For example, The Express Tribune explicitly noted that this airport handover is “the first project of handing over control of Pakistani airports under IMF recommendations as part of a new $7bn loan programme.”. Such lines underline that media recognize the external economic pressure driving the decision. On the other hand, opinion pieces and letters in newspapers sometimes express nostalgia or nationalist sentiment – e.g., a letter to the editor in one paper lamented that “we built a shiny new airport only to not run it ourselves; it’s a shame we can’t manage our own assets.” This perspective, while not dominant, finds space particularly in Urdu talk shows and op-eds in papers like Nawa-i-Waqt or Express (Urdu), which have a more nationalist tone.

Overall, media coverage has been thorough and multifaceted: investigative where needed, critical in opinion pages, but mostly factual in news reporting. Social media discourse amplifies both support and criticism, often in a more raw form. The government has a PR challenge to ensure that the narrative focuses on improvements and not on “selling national assets.” So far, by using terms like “outsourcing” and “G2G partnership” (instead of “privatisation”), officials and friendly media are trying to set a positive tone. The true media verdict will likely emerge after implementation: if the takeover by the UAE is smooth and results in visible positive changes at the airport with no major controversy, media and social media will likely lean towards acknowledging it as a success (perhaps even calling for Lahore and Karachi airports to follow suit). If it goes poorly, it will attract intense criticism and be used as a case point by those opposed to privatization in general.

Conclusion: Verified Status and Next Steps

In conclusion, the Pakistan government’s decision to hand over Islamabad International Airport’s operations to a UAE entity is a confirmed development, backed by official policy shifts and documented agreements. Over the past two years, the plan evolved from a competitive PPP tender to a direct government-to-government deal – a trajectory driven by economic imperatives and practical challenges. As of mid-2025, it is verified that Pakistan is finalizing an agreement with the UAE to outsource the airport on a multi-year concession. Both Pakistani authorities and UAE representatives have signaled their commitment through MoUs, high-level visits, and preparatory work.

Key points of the verified status include:

• Timeline & Scope: A 15-year operations concession (initially planned via PPP) is now being arranged directly with the UAE, with the framework awaiting final approvals. The UAE operator will manage the airport’s commercial and operational aspects, while ownership and critical control remain with Pakistan.
  
• Official Confirmation: Pakistani ministers (like the Aviation Minister) publicly announced the outsourcing plan, and recent official communications confirm the pivot to a UAE partnership. UAE’s interest has been officially acknowledged through signed MoUs and statements of intent. The IMF and Pakistani cabinet are involved in oversight, adding credibility to the process.
  
• Deal Nature: It is an outsourcing/lease arrangement for improved management and investment, not an outright sale. Navigational and security services stay under Pakistani authority. The deal will likely include revenue-sharing (precise terms to be finalized), ensuring Pakistan gains financially while the UAE operator gains a business opportunity.
  
• Reactions & Protections: Domestic reactions range from support (for better services and foreign investment) to criticism (about transparency and national interests). Crucially, employee protections have been promised – no layoffs and job security are to be maintained. Ongoing dialogues with unions and inclusion of safeguards in the contract will be vital to honor these promises.
  
• Impact Outlook: If executed as planned, passengers can expect a higher standard of service at Islamabad Airport in the coming years, aligning with international benchmarks. Staff will undergo a transition but with assurances of continuity. The airport itself could become a success story of Pakistan–UAE cooperation, potentially increasing Pakistan’s appeal for further foreign investment in other sectors.

Moving forward, the next steps will involve formal approval and signing of the Pakistan-UAE agreement, selection/designation of the UAE operating entity, and a transition plan for the handover. The government has indicated that final decisions and signing could occur within the next couple of months. Once the agreement is inked, an implementation timeline (perhaps over a few weeks or months to transfer control) will be announced. Stakeholders – from airlines to employees – will be keenly watching those details.

In summary, all verified information points to the Islamabad Airport outsourcing being on track and likely to materialize soon. The initiative has been confirmed by multiple credible sources, and barring unforeseen hurdles, Pakistan will soon witness its first major airport under foreign management. This represents a significant shift in Pakistan’s aviation management paradigm. The status as of July 2025 is that the policy decision is made and preparations are underway, making it more than just a proposal – it is an imminent reality. The coming months will be about implementation, ensuring that the promised benefits are realized and concerns addressed, so that this partnership can truly take off to Pakistan’s advantage.

Monsoon Deluge and Flash Floods in Jhelum

Heavy monsoon rains and a cloudburst over Chakwal on July 17, 2025, triggered flash floods across northern Punjab. Torrents from overflowing nullahs and burst mini dams inundated villages in Jhelum, Chakwal and Rawalpindi districts. The Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) reported 61 people killed and 268 injured in Punjab from the downpour. In Jhelum district alone, dozens of villages were flooded, and emergency rescue operations were launched. Key facts:

• Dozens of villages in Jhelum were hit by flash floods after incessant rains on July 16–17. Storm channels like Ghan and Bunna Nullahs overflowed due to a Chakwal cloudburst, causing an emergency in Jhelum.
  
• The Punjab government imposed a state of emergency on July 18 to coordinate rescue efforts. Army helicopters and civil agencies were deployed alongside police and Rescue 1122 to reach stranded residents.
  
• In the multi-district operation, over 450 people (and their livestock) were evacuated from floodwaters in Jhelum, Sohawa and Pind Dadan Khan areas. Authorities reported that, thanks to the swift response, no civilians were killed in Jhelum — the only fatality in the operation was the police constable himself.
  

Constable Haider Ali Hussain: Background and Service

Constable Haider Ali Hussain was a 27-year-old Punjab Police officer posted at Chotala Police Station in Pind Dadan Khan tehsil. He hailed from Pindi Saidpur (Jhelum district), the only son in a family with six sisters. His father worked as a labourer in Karachi while Haider lived with his mother and siblings in Saidpur. Colleagues recall that Haider was passionate about joining the police and took great pride in rescuing children during emergencies. Key personal details:

• Full Name & Rank: Syed Haider Ali Hussain, Police Constable, Punjab Police.
  
• Hometown: Village Pindi Saidpur, Jhelum District (native village as reported by The Nation). He lived locally with his mother and siblings.
  
• Family: Only son of parents, with six sisters. His father was abroad as a labourer. Haider’s cousin noted his lifelong ambition was to serve in the police.
  
• Service Record: He was known for his dedication to duty and courage. DSP Shahbaz Ahmed praised him as “as brave as his name” and enthusiastic in saving people. Maryam Nawaz later highlighted his selfless commitment during the floods.
  

The Rescue Operation and Heroic Sacrifice

On July 17, 2025, Haider Ali joined a six-officer team evacuating villagers caught in rising floodwaters around Chotala (near Pind Dadan Khan). The team boarded a tractor trolley to carry stranded residents out of danger. As they crossed a swollen stream, the tractor overturned in the raging current. According to reports, Haider continued helping evacuees reach safety; during this effort, the sudden surge of floodwater swept him into the Jhelum River. The other officers survived. Key incident points:

• The incident occurred in the Chotala area of Jhelum district, amid extreme flash flood conditions. Heavy rainfall had turned small drains into violent currents.
  
• Over 400 residents were rescued that day in Jhelum by police, army and Rescue 1122 teams. Haider Ali’s unit was part of this massive effort: “On Thursday, more than 400 citizens trapped in the floodwaters of the Jhelum River were rescued”.
  
• Haider’s actions during the rescue directly saved many lives. Officials later noted that no local civilian fatalities occurred in this operation, thanks to the coordinated response. Only Constable Haider Ali lost his life.
  
• His body was found 24 hours later by Rescue 1122 divers. The delay was due to the treacherous currents and darkness. As DPO Tariq Sindhu reported, “during the rescue operation, the flow of water suddenly intensified, due to which Haider was swept away”.
  

Official Tributes and Confirmation

Punjab Police and government leaders publicly recognized Haider Ali’s sacrifice as exemplary. Inspector General Usman Anwar called him a martyr whose service “will long be remembered”. Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz praised the Jhelum Police team’s “extraordinary courage, swift response, and selfless commitment” in rescuing over 400 people, calling the operation “nothing short of heroic”. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif directed that full support be provided to the bereaved family and lauded Haider Ali’s bravery: “Haider Ali laid down his life while rescuing several people from the floodwaters without regard for his own safety. The entire nation is proud of Shaheed Haider Ali”. Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi echoed these sentiments, calling him a “national hero” and pledging solidarity with the family. Official confirmations:

• Punjab Police: A police spokesperson confirmed Haider was part of the flood relief team and was martyred on duty. IG Anwar stated on social media that Haider “attained martyrdom while helping flood victims”.
  
• CM Office: Punjab CM Maryam Nawaz issued an official statement expressing condolences and highlighting Haider’s courage and selflessness. She assured full provincial support for the family.
  
• PM’s Office: Through a Prime Minister’s Office release (via APP), the PM said Haider’s sacrifice “will never be forgotten” and mandated welfare measures for the family.
  
• Other: State Minister Bilal Azhar Kiyani (overseeing Jhelum) also paid homage and announced financial compensation under the police martyrs’ package for Haider’s family.
  

Funeral and Honors

Haider Ali’s funeral was held with full honors. On July 18, 2025 a funeral prayer took place at the Police Lines in Jhelum, attended by senior police officers and Punjab government officials. Provincial Adviser Dr. Azhar Mahmood Kiyani (also monitoring floods) was present and offered condolences. The ceremony was marked by traditional rites and a salute to his sacrifice. Key details:

• The funeral was offered at Police Lines Jhelum on Friday, 18 July 2025. Full police honors were accorded, recognizing him as a martyr.
  
• His body was escorted by police and rescued personnel before burial. According to The Nation, a second funeral was planned in his native Pindi Saidpur (Jhelum) to allow villagers to pay respects.
  
• Leaders including the Inspector General and other senior officers attended. Floral wreaths and flags draped his coffin.
  
• The government announced the family will receive all due benefits: a one-time grant and allowances under the Police Martyrs’ package.
  
• Flags were flown at half-mast and tributes were paid during the ceremony. His colleagues and the public saluted the fallen constable’s devotion to duty.
  

Public Reaction and Legacy

News of Constable Haider Ali’s bravery sparked an outpouring of respect on social media and in the press. Citizens hailed him as a hero who “never let his duty be compromised”. Media outlets and government accounts highlighted how his selflessness epitomized the spirit of Pakistan’s first responders. Many used hashtags like #HaiderAli and #PoliceHero to share condolences and prayers. The story also prompted political leaders beyond Punjab to express sorrow and pride. In parliament and across Pakistan, members acknowledged his sacrifice. Overall, Haider Ali’s example underscored the human cost of the floods and the courage of those risking their lives to save others.

Conclusion:

All available reports confirm the following facts: On July 17, 2025, during unprecedented monsoon flooding in Jhelum district, Police Constable Haider Ali Hussain (Punjab Police) was swept away and killed while evacuating villagers. The flash floods were caused by heavy rains and a cloudburst over Chakwal, which overwhelmed local streams and inundated Jhelum tehsils. Haider Ali had helped rescue hundreds of residents (over 400 people) that day; officials noted that no civilians perished thanks to the operation, making Haider Ali the sole fatality in that incident. Top officials – including the Punjab Chief Minister, the Inspector General of Police, and the Prime Minister – have publicly paid tribute to his courage. His funeral on July 18 was conducted with full police honors, and his family has been assured of government support.

Editor’s Note

All information in this report is drawn from verified news and official sources. We have cited Dawn News, Daily Times, ARY News, government press releases (APP, PTV, PID) and other reliable outlets to cross-check every detail. The timeline, locations, and statements above are confirmed by multiple independent sources. Only confirmed facts are presented; rumors or unverified social media posts have been excluded.